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Special Section on Open Innovation
Strategic Management  
of Open Innovation:
A DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES 
PERSPECTIVE
Marcel Bogers1,2, Henry Chesbrough2, Sohvi Heaton3, and David J. Teece2
SUMMARY
Open innovation has become well established as a new imperative for organizing 
innovation. In line with the increased use in industry, it has also attracted a lot of 
attention in academia. However, understanding the full benefits and possible limits 
of open innovation still remains a challenge. We draw on strategic management 
theory to describe some of these benefits and limits. More specifically, we develop 
a dynamic capabilities framework as a way to better understand the strategic 
management of open innovation, which can then help to better explain both success 
and failure in open innovation. With this background, as guest editors we introduce 
select papers published in this Special Section of California Management Review that 
were originally presented at the fifth annual World Open Innovation Conference, 
held in San Francisco, California, in December of 2018.
KEYWORDS: innovation, open innovation, strategic management, dynamic 
capabilities, business models
R esearch and practice on open innovation have come a long way since it was originally introduced in 2003 as a new imperative for organizing innovation.1 The main idea behind open innovation was that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal 
ideas as they look to advance their innovations. While elements of this perspec-
tive have a long lineage in the literature on innovation (e.g., Mowery, Pisano, 
Mitchell, and Teece), the modern formulation is more robust and has deeper 
more fully thought through implications for management practice. Chesbrough 
and Bogers have recently redefined open innovation as “a distributed innovation 
1University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
2University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
3Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA
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process based on purposively managed knowledge flows across organizational 
boundaries, using pecuniary and non-pecuniary mechanisms in line with the 
organization’s business model.”2
Much research has been conducted on open innovation since the term 
was introduced3 and extant research has looked into a wide variety of issues, 
ranging from the “human side”4 of open innovation to project-level attributes5 to 
platforms and ecosystems6 to public administration and societal issues more gen-
erally.7 The widening interest in open innovation is also reflected in the editorial 
for last year’s Special Section on open innovation in California Management Review 
(CMR), which was coauthored with European Commissioner Carlos Moedas.8 
The article focused on linking research, practices, and policies on open innova-
tion—for example, highlighting some key trends such as digital transformation, 
challenges such as uncertainty, and potential solutions such as European Union 
(EU) funding programs.
This year’s Special Section follows this growing body of research by pre-
senting selected papers from the fifth annual World Open Innovation Conference 
(held in San Francisco, California, in December of 2018). And we are joined by 
one of the keynote speakers to the World Open Innovation Conference held in 
2017, David Teece. This introduction integrates his insights from his keynote 
address9 with selected papers that were submitted to the conference for the fol-
lowing year.
Open Innovation Is an Imperative Today
While open innovation was first introduced as a robust concept in 2003, 
developments since have rendered open innovation an imperative in today’s 
world. The first is that sources of knowledge have dispersed in many differ-
ent places, and the geographic footprint of innovation is changing dramati-
cally. Although patent quality is problematic, China in 2012 accounted for the 
largest number of patents filed throughout the world.10 According to the 2015 
Global Innovation 1000 study, 94% of the world’s largest innovators conduct 
some components of their research and development (R&D) activities abroad.11 
This means that companies should not rely solely on their own ideas and in-
house research, but should also invite external sources to contribute. This is 
the Outside-In branch of open innovation—also referred to as inbound open 
innovation.
A second development is that intellectual property (IP) has become a criti-
cal enabler to access external ideas and let others use one’s own ideas. Strengthened 
IP rights (IPRs) facilitate open innovation adoption. In the early 1980s,12 IPRs 
were strengthened in the United States, which bolstered the market for know-
how. The rise of open innovation does not mean the role of IPRs is no longer 
important. Often, it is just the opposite. An intriguing recent study even showed 
that solar photo-voltaic makers were more collaborative after they had received 
their first patent than they were before they received the patent.13 Thus, strong 
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and certain IP protection and collaboration are complements, not substitutes, in 
aiding the innovation process.14
IP protection also matters for the other branch of open innovation: the 
Inside-Out branch—also referred to as outbound open innovation. One way to 
stimulate greater adoption of one’s own technology is to provide others with 
access via licenses with reasonable royalties. Developing and scaling technologies 
requires a significant amount of risk-taking and capital, Inside-Out approaches 
can in many cases broaden the base of revenues to achieve this. Licensing regimes 
are supported with royalties at levels sufficient to draw forth the investment 
needed to make open innovation succeed.15
A third development that has in some cases required the adoption of open 
innovation is the decline in in-house R&D. Since the 1990s, many leading compa-
nies have significantly reduced their investment in research. Some critics blame 
shareholder activism and short-term focus, while others point to the rise of research-
intensive startups funded by venture capitalists.16 Short-term investors might pres-
sure companies to adopt a shorter time horizon, and managers may cut R&D 
expenses when shareholder activists emerge on the horizon demanding cost cutting. 
As breakthrough innovation developed at corporate in-house labs becomes rarer 
and technology cycles decrease, it has become quicker and less expensive for these 
labs to rely on external sources for R&D, such as local universities and suppliers.17 
This is an adverse trend for innovation in general that could also create problems for 
the use of open innovation. To be clear, we do not advance open innovation as a 
panacea for reduced investments in R&D. Clearly, if R&D expenditures are declining 
everywhere, open innovation is at best a stopgap. Sooner or later, there will be a 
decline in inventive activity and research findings and discoveries from which others 
can draw. We are very clear that in-house R&D and open innovation ought to be 
viewed by management as complements. The one without the other is unlikely to 
succeed. This has been shown to be historically the case.18 The absorptive capacity 
needed to recognize, comprehend, and transfer advanced technology from external 
sources is rooted in deep internal technology and know-how.19
A fourth general development is that digitization has dramatically changed 
the ease and nature of information flows. More specifically, a recent trend is that 
digital convergence further renders open innovation an imperative. The techno-
business environment has changed since the widespread adoption of the Internet. 
Digital platforms are ubiquitous. Digital data and signals provide a common (0,1) 
base for handling diverse types of information, including words, sounds, and 
images.20 Widespread use of common standards allows connectivity among 
diverse information devices. “Multi-invention” and “co-innovation” contexts are 
more common (e.g., there are more than 100,000 patents involved in the iPhone).
Digital convergence requires greater connectedness and platform engage-
ment. Few firms can dominate all of the value chain activities in the era of digital 
convergence. The Internet of Things (IoT) is being rolled out across industries 
such as automobiles (e.g., flying cars requiring a convergence of technologies) and 
Smart Cities. IoT business models demand the orchestration of many partnerships 
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to deliver solutions. Systems integration is both easier and more necessary with 
open innovation. Toyota has formed the e-Palette Alliance, an ecosystem of soft-
ware and hardware support to develop a modular, and driverless vehicle designed 
for multiple purposes at once (e.g., logistics, delivery, and passenger travel). The 
alliance includes Uber, Amazon, Mazda, and Pizza Hut. Toyota uses a “plug-and-
play” open platform for developing its mobility services. Management of ecosys-
tems and access and control of complementary assets may now be more important 
to competitive advantage than installed base/switching cost considerations.
Although these trends have added reason why companies have to become 
excellent in open innovation, organizations have always, as noted earlier, relied 
to some degree on the external sourcing of ideas and innovations. As early as 
1714, the British government offered the Longitude Prize to anyone who could 
develop a method for determining a ship’s longitude. Rewards valuing £20,000 
were given in the form of encouragements.21 Even in 1969, in studying R&D labs, 
Allen and Cohen argued that “no research and development laboratory can be 
completely self-sustaining. To keep abreast of scientific and technological develop-
ments, every laboratory must necessarily import information from outside.”22 In 
the United States, 100 years ago, open innovation was not an imperative because 
there were so few internal R&D labs. Contract research was the norm.23 During 
the heyday of large corporate R&D labs (1920s-1980s)24 and U.S. technological 
dominance (1940-1990), habits of thinking became quite parochial. Some com-
panies even today remain caught in the “not invented here” trap.25
Although the external sourcing of innovation is thus not new, the current 
open innovation model is different from previous ones. In almost every firm 
today, the best ideas and people lie elsewhere. This is partly a function of the glo-
balization of business and advances in education and technological catch up. 
Companies are now able to connect with large and global technical communities 
quickly, which inevitably results in a more efficient ways to find the right solu-
tions for problems that otherwise might have been hard to solve.26 More and 
more work activities have become digitally connected, and new patterns of cross-
functional collaboration have emerged. Timely access to domain and technology 
expertise is critical to firm-level competitiveness. As in line with the dynamic 
capabilities perspective, active engagement by practically all firms in sensing/out-
sourcing of technology is now required. Scouting/sensing tools need to be devel-
oped. Seizing/orchestration/integrating skills are now paramount. So fundamental 
are these developments that today’s open innovation is qualitatively and quanti-
tatively different from that of the pre-Internet era.
Strategic Choice Variables in Open Innovation
Open innovation has been used to describe a wide variety of activities, 
from open source software development to crowdsourcing to competitions and 
prizes, to licensing, to contract research, to industry-university collaborations and 
engagement between corporations and startups. In such a complex landscape, it 
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can help to employ some heuristics. There are two fundamental choice variables 
with open innovation: the technology development business model (proportion of in-
house versus contract R&D) and IP strategy (nonproprietary [open] versus pro-
prietary). In almost every technology development context, there are many key 
issues along these two variables: Does one source the technology internally or 
externally? What (complementary) technologies does one need to bring together 
to produce desirable products/services? What other (complementary) assets 
does one need? Do I build a platform? What IP strategy/posture will I take? The 
two variables are somewhat interdependent, as a robust market for know-how 
depends on the existence of IPRs and the opportunity for unstructured technical 
dialogue.27 These choices exist both for value creation and (separately) for value 
capture/commercialization. Firms may employ unique forms of property rights, 
such as modularity, where individual contributors and inventors, both internal 
and external to the firm, appropriate value.28 See Figure 1 for an illustration of 
these choices.
Put differently, open innovation implicates business model choice and 
technology strategy issues. In reality, the “open” versus “closed” distinction is just 
a matter of definition and degree. Varying degrees of openness exist among 
firms.29 Firms can decide which parts of the knowledge can be made open and 
which parts remain proprietary. Apple has used a combination of open and closed 
innovation. It developed its iPhone software with closed innovation, but it used 
open innovation for the initial hardware design, and also for its iPhone app store. 
Open versus closed innovation thus involves both business model design and IP 
strategy issues.
On the basis of these two dimensions, firms can embrace open innovation 
in different ways (Figure 1). Qualcomm, developing proprietary technology 
mainly through in-house R&D, for instance, has embraced open innovation by 
building open ecosystems through licensing to its complementors, who in turn 
design and build final products for consumers. Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, 
Motorola, IBM, and others built a number of technology platforms under ETSI 
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute)/3GPP (Third Generation 
Partnership Project) that fed an ecosystem that enhanced and combined proprie-
tary core technologies.30 This allowed the mobile phone industry to benefit from 
hundreds of thousands of engineers employed by thousands of firms, who have 
cooperated and competed to deliver solutions that were compatible across firms 
and continually improving across time. As noted elsewhere,31 this may be the 
greatest example of cooperation in technology development the world has ever 
seen, mediated by ETSI/3GPP under an FRAND licensing regime. This coordina-
tion, while unusual, is a quintessential case of open innovation.32 As Qualcomm 
notes, their business model
is one of the greatest successes of open innovation in the world. Our business 
model has democratized access to mobile technology. We created mobile broad-
band . . . open innovation is the spirit of our licensing and chipset business. Our 
inventions span new market places and vibrant ecosystems. More and more 
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 companies are mobile first. Look at Uber, Snapchat, Waze, mobile banking . . . 
they sit on top of and are enabled by over 30 years of R&D in wireless . . . every 
time you touch your phone, you touch a Qualcomm invention. You may not real-
ize it because it is being presented to you by our partners in open innovation.33
Similar to Qualcomm, Tesla has built proprietary technology largely 
through in-house R&D, but its IP strategy has departed from Qualcomm by shift-
ing to nonproprietary strategy. Elon Musk noted that
we felt compelled to create patents out of concern that the big car companies 
would copy our technology and then use their massive manufacturing, sales and 
marketing power to overwhelm Tesla . . . the unfortunate reality is the opposite: 
electric car programs (or programs for any vehicle that doesn’t burn hydrocar-
bons) at the major manufacturers are small to non-existent, constituting an aver-
age of far less than 1% of their total vehicle sales.34
Whereas Tesla’s revenue model is primarily product based, Qualcomm is 
both product (in particular, modems) and technology (IP) based. The latter ele-
ment is now likely injured by clumsy interventions by antitrust authorities in 
several countries where the courts and/or regulators seem to know little about 
open innovation and almost nothing about technology licensing. With limited 
competition and sales in the electric vehicle industry, Tesla adopted an open 
FIGURE 1. Different forms of open innovation by technology development business 
model and IP strategy.
Note: IP ! intellectual property; R&D ! research and development.
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patent system, as it could not produce enough electric cars to solve the carbon 
crisis by itself. In his post in 2014, Musk pledged that Tesla would not initiate pat-
ent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wanted to use its technology.35 He 
also commented, “We believe that applying the open source philosophy to our 
patents will strengthen rather than diminish Tesla’s position in this regard.”36 IBM 
took a similar open patent strategy by establishing the Eco-Patent Commons, 
where solutions may be easily shared to accelerate implementation to protect the 
environment and may lead to more innovation.37
Cisco is an example of a firm that used open innovation through acquisi-
tions. Whatever technology the company needed, it acquired from the outside, 
usually by partnering with or investing in promising startups. In this way, Cisco 
kept up with the R&D output of perhaps the world’s finest industrial R&D organi-
zation, all without conducting much research of its own.38 Cisco recognized that 
the best ideas can come from outside the company. John Chambers, chairman 
emeritus of Cisco, who completed 180 mergers and acquisitions during his 20-year 
term, said, “Learn about tech M&As or the future might happen without you.”39
Another form of open innovation is open sourcing. Linux is an open source 
operating system, developed by thousands of programmers collaborating around 
the world. The Linux Foundation works on downstream uses, such as govern-
ment and academia, to help it understand how to use open source. It also works 
with upstream industry users and individual contributors to foster adoption of 
open source solutions. For example, studios started sharing software as open 
source through Linux in the fields of animation and visual effects and also used 
Linux for blockbuster films (e.g., the Lord of the Rings trilogy, and Titanic).40 The 
corporate world has caught on to this, with Microsoft acquiring the open source 
repository GitHub for $7 billion in 2018, and IBM acquiring RedHat (the leading 
distributor of Linux) for $34 billion in 2019.
A Dynamic Capabilities Approach to Managing Open 
Innovation
It is clear that the open innovation approach sometimes does not require 
strong IPRs but it often does. Markets for know-how simply do not work well 
without strong and clear (i.e., certain) IPRs.41 Open innovation almost always 
requires one to combine external and internal sources of know-how. Accordingly, 
open innovation requires new management approaches and deep (systems) capa-
bilities in technology “integration.” A strong commitment to open innovation 
will dramatically expand the number of technology partners one has to evaluate 
and work with. Open innovation often requires assembling a portfolio of IPRs. 
Partnerships can often lead to leakage of trade secrets. End-to-end integration is 
harder and requires extensive collaboration. System integration is a major chal-
lenge.42 Studies have found considerable heterogeneity in open innovation per-
formance among companies, depending on their ability to master these challenges 
associated with openness.43 The articles in this special section further develop 
these challenges in managing collaborations with external sources of innovation.
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Companies that have successfully capitalized on open innovation are char-
acterized by the organizational flexibility required to restructure their existing 
business models to accommodate open innovation strategies.44 In other words, 
smart “asset” orchestration involving the combination of internal and external 
technologies to align with one’s business model is what makes open innovation 
work. In a world of widely diffuse useful knowledge, much of the real value can 
be gained not from developing yet another piece of knowledge, but rather from 
creating systems and architectures that combine these disparate pieces of knowl-
edge together in useful ways that solve real problems. This “systems integration” 
or systems architecture capability is of particular value in an open innovation 
environment.45
We can perhaps better understand co-invention/co-innovation opportuni-
ties and strategic choices by integrating the open innovation concept into the 
dynamic capabilities framework. Dynamic capabilities are the firm’s ability to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments in which there is deep uncertainty.46 In the 
dynamic capabilities perspective, a key to sustained profitable growth is the ability 
to recombine and reconfigure assets and organizational structures as the enter-
prise grows and as markets and technologies change.47 This “orchestration” pro-
cess involves the modification, addition, divestment, and alignment of tangible 
and intangible assets. This requires shifting resources such as talent and money to 
where they will deliver the most value.48
Dynamic capabilities are undergirded by three sets of organizational pro-
cesses: sensing, seizing, and transforming capabilities. These three clusters of 
dynamic capabilities can help companies effectively reap the full benefits of open 
innovation (see Table 1 for an overview).
Outside-In open innovation requires sensing, sense-making, and the filter-
ing of externally developed technologies. The sensing capability can assist compa-
nies in identifying and evaluating valuable external knowledge, and establishing 
cross-boundary collaboration outside the business. It is critical to be able to attract 
lots of ideas, and then evaluate, select, and remove the bad ones. For example, 
Kraft Foods Australia hosted a public naming contest for its new Vegemite-based 
cheese snack. It initially chose iSnack 2.0 from the submissions and encountered 
widespread ridicule, and eventually abandoned it. The company instead let con-
sumers choose a name among submissions and the company picked the most 
popular one, Vegemite Cheesybite.49
We have established that open innovation is not about primarily outsourc-
ing R&D to somebody else. It is about leveraging and enhancing internal capabili-
ties, either to enhance one’s own business model (Outside-In open innovation) or 
to explore a new business model (Inside-Out open innovation).50 Also, ideas 
alone are not worth much if not executed well. To successfully use knowledge 
from external sources, companies need to employ various organizational practices 
such as extensive delegation, intensive lateral and vertical communication, and 
rewards for knowledge sharing.51 Moreover, many solutions from the outside are 
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not “plug and play” with internal technologies, systems, and services. Significant 
adaptation and integration are required to take them to market. Therefore, suc-
cessful open innovation also requires the seizing capability.
Companies also need to realign their organizations to integrate external 
knowledge sources, which often requires transforming capability. Integrating 
external knowledge may cause disruption and require a cultural change. Open 
innovation success depends largely on developing a culture that promotes col-
laboration and overcomes the not-invented-here and not-sold-here syndromes.52 
For example, Lego’s creative culture is rooted in its efforts in fostering open inno-
vation and heeds the wisdom of crowds in creating new products.53 Many compa-
nies are willing to build a collaborating culture that is open to external ideas, but 
it is not always obvious how to make the shift.54
Both Outside-In and Inside-Out open innovation strategies are needed to 
advance the transforming capability in dynamic capabilities. Chesbrough et al.55 
employ open innovation strategy and the dynamic capabilities perspective to 
explain the performance difference among the high-speed rail, semiconductor, 
and automobile industries in China. They find varying levels of application of 
open strategy across the industry and conclude that open strategy is critical to suc-
ceed and to effectuate the dynamic capabilities of the party, which in turns helps 
develop and maintain the dynamic capabilities of innovating firms.
Limits to Open Innovation
There are cases, though, when, in order to achieve dynamic capabilities, 
open innovation cannot be employed. The limits to open innovation need a great 
deal more scholarly attention, so we will simply sketch out some initial ideas and 
discuss two specific companies, Qualcomm and SpaceX, to illustrate them.
TABLE 1. The Interrelation of Dynamic Capabilities and Open Innovation.
Cluster of 
Dynamic 

















Put processes into place 
to commercialize ideas
Set good governance 
mechanisms
Establish cross-boundary 
collaboration outside the 
business
Realign the organization to 
integrate external knowledge
Develop a culture that promotes 
collaboration
Adjust the mix of internally 
developed and externally 
developed technologies to 
reflect changing needs and 
opportunities
Note: R&D ! research and development.
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Qualcomm is a company based in San Diego, California, that specializes in 
cellular and wireless telephony. It is best known for its CDMA (Code-Division 
Multiple Access) technology that provided a more efficient way to utilize scarce 
airwave capacity to support a higher number of cellular phone calls. Today, the 
company is a global leader in wireless telephony technology for 5G applications, 
and it just won an important design competition against Intel to sell in the next 
generation of mobile telephony chips at Apple for its 5G iPhones starting in 2020.56
Qualcomm did not initially achieve its success through open innovation, 
however. When the company won its first contract in the 1980s to design a satel-
lite messaging system, they chose to utilize a clever technique to get more capacity 
out of a slice of the airwaves (called spectrum) used to communicate with the 
satellite. This technology became known as CDMA technology. It was incompat-
ible with earlier wireless telephony technologies, including one that was begin-
ning to gain real volume in the cellular market, known as TDMA (Time-Division 
Multiple Access). At the time, none of the companies in the cellular business that 
Qualcomm talked to had much interest in CDMA. They felt that the technology 
was unproven. While it looked good in theory, it might not work in practice. And 
there was the alternative TDMA technology that was already working.
At this time, open innovation probably would not have worked, because 
the required technology did not exist, and the leading suppliers of the dominant 
technology of the era felt that this new approach would not be feasible (we will 
see this pattern again with SpaceX below). This meant that Qualcomm had to 
vertically integrate. It built the handsets and the cellular phones themselves. It 
had to build the base stations that relayed the cellular signal from tower to 
tower to handle the call. It had to develop all of the software to make the hard-
ware work. It had to finance the development and deployment of multiple dem-
onstrations of the technology, both in Los Angeles in 1989 and in New York City 
in 1990.
In 1991, Qualcomm got its first customer, who turned out to be the Korean 
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute. By 1993, it began to 
receive its first real royalty revenues for CDMA technology, eight long years after 
Qualcomm started on the satellite messaging project. It was only much later, once 
CDMA technology was deployed at dozens of telecommunications companies 
around the world, that Qualcomm downscaled its vertical integration approach. 
CDMA has proven itself in dozens of carriers around the world, and Qualcomm is 
leading efforts to further advance the technology, to 5G and beyond. It now faces 
key competition (and some cooperation) from Huawei and other technology lead-
ers, but is now able to utilize open innovation far more extensively than it could 
30 years ago. The governance provided by ETSI/3GPP is key to the success of open 
innovation, and the U.S. antitrust apparatus (the Federal Trade Commission 
[FTC]) has positioned itself (unwittingly) as an enemy of that model.57
Open innovation is not always the best path forward for technological 
development. There was no way for Qualcomm to partner with outsiders to create 
CDMA, because the technology was too unproven and required coordination of 
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many subtle interdependencies. There were few potential partners. Qualcomm 
had to go it alone and it did.
The public data sources that have tracked important moments in the his-
tory of SpaceX provide another powerful illustration of these points. According to 
some accounts,58 Musk’s vision of space exploration began with the goal of trying 
to launch some living organism from Earth to Mars. In pursuit of this goal, he and 
a colleague went looking for a rocket to propel the organism. While they began in 
Europe, at Arianespace, they found those rockets to be prohibitively expensive. 
During their conversations with European sources, they heard of a possibility of 
purchasing some “repurposed ICBMs” from Russia to use as a rocket instead.
Ultimately, the Russian sources did not provide any rocket to Musk. But his 
experience with trying to purchase a rocket from them prompted him to decide to 
build his own rocket.59 His key insight was that, in order for interplanetary space 
travel to become affordable, rockets would need to be reusable. While this was 
sensible, it went directly against all of the prior history and design paradigms of 
rocketry, from the ballistic missiles of World War II to the Soyuz and Apollo mis-
sions of the world’s leading aeronautics manufacturers, the Soviet Union and the 
United States.
This situation reminds us of an obvious limit to open innovation. When all 
of the useful, abundant external knowledge available is built upon an outdated 
(e.g., TDMA) or obsolete (e.g., disposable rockets) “business” model for what Dosi 
and others have called a “technological paradigm,”60 there may be no way to 
employ open innovation to advance one’s technology. Musk’s decision to commit 
to a reusable rocket also committed SpaceX to the use of vertical integration to 
achieve this objective. There were no preexisting ecosystems around low-cost 
reusable rockets, so he had to create one with SpaceX. Open innovation requires 
a rich technological commons.
SpaceX has continued to go its own way in its technology development and 
continues to closely coordinate complex technologies. On other occasions, it has 
occasionally found itself facing a second limit to open innovation, that of small 
numbers bargaining situations. SpaceX works with suppliers such as Alcoa, who 
had critical capabilities that SpaceX needed to fabricate the aluminum domes in its 
launch vehicles. When Alcoa greatly increased its prices to SpaceX, Musk tried to 
invent around Alcoa’s capabilities, so that SpaceX would not become hostage to 
these sources.61 This is managerial action straight out of transaction cost econom-
ics.62 It reminds us that complex technologies that feature subtle interdependen-
cies require internal administrative processes to orchestrate these complexities. 
Similarly, when there are very few sources of critical technologies, companies 
may do better by doing things themselves, rather than utilizing open innovation 
processes to achieve those objectives.
From another perspective, though, SpaceX embodies open innovation 
quite well. For over 50 years, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) relied on a form of quasi-vertical integration to develop, organize, and 
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deploy launches into space. The rise of SpaceX has presented NASA with an exter-
nal partner to provide launch services. Indeed, NASA’s leadership now describes 
its mission as being focused on the development of a private space industry for the 
rest of the twenty-first century, partnering with Space X, Boeing, and other com-
panies instead of doing it all itself.63
The Articles in the Special Section on Open Innovation
In the above, we introduced some key attributes of how open innovation 
works in general and how it can be considered from a dynamic capabilities perspec-
tive. While this may offer some building blocks for a framework to better under-
stand (and manage) open innovation, it also shows that open innovation may be 
a (strategic) balancing act among a complex set of factors. This is also evident from 
the papers that were selected for the Special Section based on the fifth annual World 
Open Innovation Conference in December of 2018, as we briefly summarize below.
The importance on ensuring the success of an open innovation project 
(and avoiding its failure) features explicitly in the article by Rouyre and Fernandez 
on “Managing Knowledge Sharing-Protecting Tensions in Coupled Innovation 
Projects.” The authors build on a case study of Galileo, a European project 
launched in 2001 to develop a satellite positioning system, to show how the orga-
nizations in the project managed the tension between knowledge sharing and 
protection—also known as the open innovation paradox. They find that the coo-
petitive64 nature of the relationships in a so-called coupled open innovation pro-
cess required a more formal strategy that included a centralized project structure 
that enables formal knowledge sharing to avoid unwanted knowledge transfers 
between competitors.
This tension nicely deepens an earlier point we made about connecting 
open innovation with dynamic capabilities. Each side in a deep collaboration like 
Galileo has a strategy, and achieving a successful innovation result requires con-
siderable knowledge sharing on one hand and some means for limiting the shar-
ing of other knowledge on the other hand. IPRs help manage this tension, but 
Rouyre and Fernandez remind us that organizational design and collaboration 
design also have important roles to play in managing appropriability between 
partners in a complex open innovation project. Put another way, IPRs can protect 
codified knowledge, but deep collaboration requires the sharing of tacit knowl-
edge as well, and organizational design may be a more effective way to prevent 
any unwanted tacit knowledge leaks.
Similarly, the article by Schmeiss, Hoelzle, and Tech, “Designing Governance 
Mechanisms in Platform Ecosystems: Addressing the Paradox of Openness through 
Blockchain Technology,” also addresses this paradox of when to share knowledge, 
which they frame as the tension between value creation and capture in joint 
innovation. Although they also consider the governance mechanisms in such a 
context, they approach this problem from another angle by considering how 
blockchain technology may be used to design novel governance mechanisms. 
With a specific focus on startups that aim to build a new platform ecosystem, they 
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derive a framework that highlights how blockchain technology may be used to 
address issues of access, control, and incentives. These issues are embedded in the 
technical architecture of the platform and enable the standardization of interac-
tions across the ecosystem.
Schmeiss et al. consider blockchain from both a knowledge management 
perspective and a dynamic capabilities perspective as well. A distributed ledger 
can capture codified knowledge but will fail to incorporate tacit knowledge. 
Moreover, many blockchains have trouble evolving over time. The features that 
make them attractive—such as distributing the ledger, immutability of data 
entries, anonymity of the participants, and fixing the consensus mechanisms—
also make them more difficult to change when new requirements or new possi-
bilities emerge. The sensing, seizing, and transforming of dynamic capabilities 
mean that new blockchain designs must be able to adapt to incorporate each of 
these aspects into their formal structure in some way, lest the blockchain be over-
taken by unanticipated future events and thus rendered irrelevant.
Finally, the article by Lee, Fong, Barney, and Hawk on “Why Do Experts 
Solve Complex Problems Using Open Innovation? Evidence from the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry” takes a broader perspective on why or how firms choose 
to adopt open innovation. Using large-scale data from the pharmaceutical indus-
try, they find that the complexity65 under which firms tend to adopt a particular 
type of open innovation—in their case, they consider crowdsourcing, coopetition, 
science-based, and network forms of open innovation—moderates the relation-
ship between project expertise66 and the choice of open or closed innovation. This 
work offers important insights into the complex nature of the decision to adopt 
open innovation, which we need to better understand to find out what exact 
mechanisms determine success or failure from open innovation, and when open 
innovation should or should not be used.
Lee et al. thereby extend our knowledge of how to organize for innovation 
by allowing us to explicitly factor in expert sources of knowledge outside the 
boundary of the firm. It is important to treat these external sources with respect 
and to understand their motivations for engaging with firms who want to address 
complex problems. A firm with strong dynamic capabilities must, among other 
things, be capable of attracting highly intelligent outside experts and enticing them 
to work on some of their important problems. We would hasten to add that such a 
firm must still retain a strong, vibrant internal R&D capability, not only to attract 
these outside experts, but also to better comprehend and evaluate their output to 
determine whether that constitutes the best way forward for an innovation.
Conclusion
We have introduced some key considerations for how open innova-
tion has emerged over time and in what ways it is currently relevant. We then 
explored two fundamental choice variables for managing open innovation—
the technology development business model and IP strategy—that we linked 
to a dynamic capabilities perspective as an approach to better understand (and 
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manage) open innovation. This provided some key attributes and an initial 
framework for the strategic management of open innovation, which should 
provide insights into when to use and when not to use open innovation. We fur-
ther explored this perspective through some examples, which offer a basis for 
and future outlook on the practice and research of open innovation. Similarly, 
our discussion of open innovation and dynamic capabilities offered a basis to 
introduce the papers that were selected for this Special Section. Each of these 
articles has important implications by adding more fine-grained details on the 
strategic management of open innovation through their focus on issues such as 
coopetition, the paradox of openness, and the role of complexity and experi-
ence in the face of choosing open or closed innovation. These articles not only 
address aspects of the dynamic capabilities perspective on open innovation, but 
they also specifically explore both positive and limiting aspects of open innova-
tion in differing contexts. Taken together, we believe there is great promise in 
further exploring the more detailed antecedents, mechanisms, outcomes, and 
contingencies of open innovation. Future research and practice in this domain 
should go beyond seeing open innovation as outsourcing R&D to somebody else 
and should rather focus on the particular attributes that are related to leverag-
ing and enhancing internal capabilities, either to enhance one’s own business 
model through Outside-In open innovation or to explore a new business model 
through Inside-Out open innovation. This should then provide a better under-
standing of the benefits and limits of open innovation to thereby provide a bet-
ter grasp of how to strategically manage this new innovation imperative.
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